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Social Costs: Where Does the Market End?
 *
 
 
The markets are a powerful economic coordination mechanism. Even so, their limitations 
cannot, and should not, be ignored. The wide range of costs originating from business activities 
within the framework of capitalism and subsequently externalised or, more accurately, 
transferred to other agents or to society as a whole with no repercussions on the price 
mechanism, is one particularly striking example of these limitations. This article contrasts the 
different concepts of social costs existing in economics literature, ranging from the 
identification of the problem as a ͞market failure͟ to the more heterodox (and less well-
known) concept of K. William Kapp, according to whom social costs are an intrinsic and 
inevitable problem within the institutional context of capitalism. The nature of the problem is 
discussed initially, followed by a presentation, albeit brief, of two fundamental fault lines 
separating the prevailing conventional approach and Kapp͛s heterodox one: the concept of 
efficiency adopted and the way in which the question of valuation of social costs is viewed.  
Keywords: social costs; externalities; market failures; market; efficiency; social value.  
 
 
Introduction  
In a stimulating book published recently, entitled The Value of Nothing, Raj Patel very clearly 
illustrates, by means of several examples, the diversity, range and above all the importance 
of social costs resulting from business activities within the framework of contemporary 
capitalism (Patel, 2011, in particular ch. 3). The truth is, however, that our understanding of 
these costs and how to deal with them in terms of public policy is still far from settled.  
Conventional economic theory regarding social costs, which stems from A. C. Pigou͛s The 
Economics of Welfare (1932 [1920]) but lacks his subtlety of analysis, is based on the 
understanding that these costs are ͞eǆteƌŶalities͟ – a market failure. This approach, which 
remained relatively uncontroversial until the early 1960s, was substantially challenged by 
the work of Ronald Coase in ͞The Problem of Social Cost͟ (1960). According to this author, 
rather than market failure, the problem of social costs is, in fact, the result of the non-
existence of markets, either because the property rights that would make them viable are 
not clearly assigned, or because the transaction costs (the costs of market functioning) are 
prohibitive. In both approaches, however, social costs are reduced merely to a problem of 
the inefficient allocation of economic resources. Moreover, although it represents a 
                                                 
* Article published in RCCS 95 (December 2011). 
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significant paradigm shift in the analysis of social costs (Medema, 1994), Coase͛s aŶalǇsis 
may still be considered canonical, essentially using the conceptual framework and analytical 
tools of traditional microeconomic theory. It is not therefore surprising that it features in 
nearly all microeconomics and public economics textbooks used nowadays in universities 
throughout the world. 
On the fringes of this prevailing line of thought, the work of Karl William Kapp merits 
attention. A distinguished, but relatively unknown, critical economist in the tradition of 
American institutionalism whose ideas were strongly rooted in European thought, Kapp 
dedicated most of his academic work to the problem of social costs for more than a quarter 
of a century. In a seminal book, The Social Costs of Private Enterprise,1 and various 
subsequent works, Kapp shows that social costs are an inexorable product of the intrinsic 
logic of capitalism, with unavoidable political dimensions, and he questions the search for 
solutions to the problem of social costs via the market (as Coase tends to argue) or economic 
calculations based on market prices (as was also the case with Pigou). 
In order to clarify the nature of the problem from the outset, it is therefore important to 
confront these different concepts of social costs. This will be the aim of the next section, in 
which particular attention will be paid to K. William Kapp, given the ƌeadeƌ͛s pƌesuŵed 
relative lack of familiarity with his work. The section which follows this aims to present, 
albeit briefly, two essential fault lines between the conventional approach to social costs and 
the heterodox approach of K. William Kapp, namely (1) the relevant concept of efficiency 
and (2) the problem of the valuation of social costs. The text ends with some concluding 
remarks.  
 
1. The Nature of the Problem 
1.1. Social costs as ͞externalities͟ (market failure) 
In conventional economics literature, social costs are externalities.
2
 The latter are 
understood as the unplanned consequences of the activities of one or more economic 
agents (individuals or firms)
3
 which affect the well-being or productive capacity of others 
                                                 
1
 The book was first published in 1950, and a revised edition appeared in 1963 under the title The Social Costs 
of Business Enterprise. 
2
 Negative externalities. Similarly, we may refer to positive externalities when the issue is one of social benefits, 
rather than costs.  
3
The specific origin of the externality – whether production or consumption – is irrelevant. 
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involved in the economic process, for which it is not possible to obtain or demand 
compensation.
4
 They are residual or secondary5 effects of the main economic activity of the 
agent – ͞eǆteƌŶal͟ effects – which escape the working of the price mechanism. They are 
external economies or diseconomies.  
The basic problem here is the inability of the price mechanism to assure a compensation 
for the damage (or benefits) caused or, in the language of economists, to internalise these 
effects.
6
 It is a market failure or, in other words, a situation in which the markets prove 
incapable of ensuring the ͞effiĐieŶt͟ allocation of economic resources. Within the dominant 
analytical framework of economics this is equivalent to saying that the Pareto optimum has 
been violated.
7
 If there can be no compensation, within the logic of the potential Pareto 
improvement test, that is, in situations in which the damage caused by the action of an 
agent is greater than the advantages it offers to another agent or economic sector, it is 
impossible to achieve ͞optimality.͟8 Externalities therefore represent a problem for which 
corrective action is justifiable.
9
 In the Pigouvian tradition, this generally means state 
intervention in the form of taxes, subsidies or state regulation.  
 
1.2. Social costs as the result of a lack of markets 
Ronald Coase rejects the idea of social costs as external damage (thus also rejecting the term 
͞externalities͟Ϳ. In his view, it is  wrong to consider the problem of social costs as the result 
of damage imposed unilaterally on others and as a question of lack of compensation 
                                                 
4
 Damages not perceived as such by the various economic actors in question are not considered externalities. 
Environmental degradation, for example, only represents a significant problem when people feel that it affects 
their well-being (Franzini, 2006: 58). 
5
 See, for example, Fernandes (2011: 140). 
6
 The effects on third parties internalised by the action of the price mechanism – the so-called pecuniary 
externalities – are, from this point of view, irrelevant. They are not even considered true externalities. They are 
part of the normal functioning of the market. This is the case, for example, with the negative effects on the 
well-being of local residents in a tourist area due to price increases during the holiday season as a result of the 
large influx of tourists. 
7
 A situation is considered to be Pareto optimal (or Pareto efficient) if it is not possible to improve the level of 
well-being of one given economic agent without implying a reduction in the well-being of at least one other 
agent. 
8
 On the potential Pareto improvement test and the Kaldor-Hicks compensation criterion, see, for example, 
Bromley (1990) and Zerbe Jr. (2001).  
9
 Only the externalities relevant from the point of view of the Pareto optimum are of interest. If, for example, a 
fiƌŵ͛s decision adversely affects the well-being of its workers or the community, but the damage caused is 
lesser than the improvement of the well-being of its shareholders, there is no justification, within the logic of 
efficiency (the only relevant argument within the framework of this approach), for any corrective measures.  
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(internalisation) from the agent generating the damage to the agent(s) bearing the damage. 
Ultimately, everyone is responsible for the existence of the problem and for resolving it.  
Social costs result from situations in which the agents involved establish a reciprocal 
relationship with regard to the object of the damage. In a relationship between two agents, 
A and B, ͞both parties cause the damage.͟ Preventing damage to B implies causing damage 
to A. There are costs for both parties. It is therefore desirable for both to take the damage 
into consideration when deciding on their course of action (Coase, 1960: 13).  
The question which should be asked, as Coase seeks to demonstrate using several 
examples of actual legal cases, is: should A be allowed to harm B or should B be allowed to 
harm A? It is a matter of deciding whose interests will be protected by law and by the courts, 
i.e., which interests will acquire the status of rights (Medema, 1994: 69). These rights have a 
dual nature (Medema, 1994: 68-69; 2009: 105): granting a right to one party implies 
exposing others to the effects of exercising this right, which implies costs.
10
  
Rather than a market failure, for Coase social costs reveal a problem of non-existence of 
markets resulting from a failure to define the property rights that permit (and facilitate) 
transactions. This is, in the end, a failure of the state (Medema, 1996: 102). Once these 
rights have been clearly assigned, (voluntary) transactions may take place in favour of those 
who value them most, leading, in the absence of transaction costs,
11
 to a Pareto efficient 
allocation regardless of the initial attribution of property rights. The problem ceases to exist. 
This is the famous result known as the ͞Coase theoƌeŵ.͟  
In reality, however, given the unavoidable empirical relevance of transaction costs – 
preventing the realisation of the theorem in practical terms – what is really important, 
according to Coase, is not that this result, so highly prized by market enthusiasts (and a great 
many economics textbooks) represents the solution, but rather the essential role played by 
the law (and the courts) in allocating economic resources. Due to the prohibitive cost of 
negotiation, rights tend to be exercised under the terms of their initial attribution – ͞ƌights 
stiĐk ǁheƌe theǇ hit͟ ;Medeŵa, ϭϵϵϰ: ϳϲͿ. 
According to Coase, the answer to the question of to whom property rights should be 
assigned is clear: the damage which is greatest should be avoided (Coase, 1960: 2). Rather 
                                                 
10
 ͞The Đost of eǆeƌĐisiŶg a ƌight is alǁaǇs the loss ǁhiĐh is suffeƌed elseǁheƌe iŶ ĐoŶseƋueŶĐe of the eǆeƌĐise 
of that right – the inability to cross land, to park a car, to build a house, to enjoy a view, to have peace and 
Ƌuiet oƌ to ďƌeathe ĐleaŶ aiƌ͟ ;Coase, 1960: 44). 
11
 The costs of market functioning. 
RCCS Annual Review, 4, October 2012                                                                                                           Social Costs: Where Does the Market End? 
 
133 
than placing the entire burden oŶ those ͞ƌespoŶsiďle͟ foƌ the daŵage aŶd tƌǇiŶg ďǇ all 
means possible to eliminate this damage, the solution to the problem of social costs lies in 
choosing the most advantageous alternative. It is an exercise in calculating gains and losses. 
It involves knowing whether the gains that result from preventing the damage are greater or 
lesser than the losses caused by measures designed to eliminate it (Coase, 1960: 27). For 
example, if river pollution kills fish, the value of the loss of the fish should be compared with 
the value of the production made possible by the activity causing the pollution. The ground 
rule for making decisions, Coase argues, is to choose the situation that maximises the total 
value of production.  
This obviously implies knowing the value of what is acquired and what is sacrificed. 
According to Coase ;ϭϵϳϬa: ϯϱͿ, ͞it is not always, or ever, easy to decide which course [of 
action] to take. But the nature of choice is clear.͟ Continuing in his own words, it is a 
decision that ͞is no different from deciding whether a field should be used for growing 
wheat or barley, and it is certainly not one about which we should show any great emotion. 
It is a difficult and important question, but it is certainly just a question of valuation͟ (Coase, 
1970b: 9, my italics).  
To sum up, in redefining the nature of the problem, Coase also questions two 
fundamental aspects of the traditional approach to externalities: 1) the idea that social costs 
ĐoƌƌespoŶd to ͞ŵaƌket failuƌe͟; ϮͿ the uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg that the solutioŶ to the pƌoďleŵ 
iŶeǀitaďlǇ iŶǀolǀes ͞ĐoƌƌeĐtiǀe͟ ŵeasuƌes ďǇ the state, ŶaŵelǇ taǆes aŶd suďsidies. Yet, as 
will become clear later, this reasoning is still based on traditional microeconomic theory.  
 
1.3. Social costs as a problem intrinsic to capitalism 
In various essential aspects K. William Kapp͛s aŶalǇsis of social costs represents a break with 
previous approaches. In his view, social costs are business costs transferred to third parties 
or the community as a whole and ͞uŶpaid͟ (oƌ ͞uŶĐoŵpeŶsated͟) by the agents who 
produce them. They are widespread, though very dissimilar, phenomena in capitalist 
economies, intrinsically linked to production and inevitable within the framework of profit-
based economies. They are, nevertheless, costs that may be minimised through reforms and 
appropriate institutional changes. 
According to Kapp, the existence of social costs is fundamentally due to the fact that the 
search for profit results in an emphasis on minimising the private costs of production. In 
RCCS Annual Review, 4, October 2012                                                                                                           Social Costs: Where Does the Market End? 
 
134 
minimising their internal costs, companies will tend to transfer to third parties and the 
community in general, and effectively maximise, social costs (that is, the portion of the total 
Đosts usuallǇ teƌŵed ͞eǆteƌŶal͟ Đosts iŶ tƌaditioŶal eĐoŶoŵiĐs liteƌatuƌeͿ.  
Rather than the mere residual or secondary effects of a main activity – an undesirable co-
product – social costs are instead an intrinsic and necessary feature of profit-based 
economies. The capitalist economy is, in Kapp͛s ǁoƌds, an ͞eĐoŶoŵy of unpaid costs͟.  
These costs cover a broad range of environmental and social diseconomies, including such 
diverse and heterogeneous aspects as environmental pollution, the depletion of renewable 
resources and the exhaustion of non-renewable resources, urban congestion, deteriorating 
working conditions, workplace accidents and occupational diseases, the harmful effects of 
technological change, economic instability and unemployment and, as has begun to emerge 
with particular acuteness during the course of the current crisis, the sacrifice of iŶdiǀiduals͛ 
well-being to the rhythms, interests and demands of the economic machine. They include, in 
fact, a wide ͞ǀaƌiety of ͚diseconomies͛, increased risks and uncertainties which may extend 
far into the future͟ ;Kapp, ϭϵϲϯ: ϭϴϱͿ.  
In a recent re-ƌeadiŶg of Kapp͛s work, Maurizio Franzini (2006) argues that Kappian social 
costs should be understood as violations of basic social rights, or even a reversal of these 
rights. It is therefore completely irrelevant whether the damage caused by the action of an 
agent, measured as losses in the well-being of those who suffer them, are greater or lesser 
than the advantages they bring to those who produce them (a central question, as we have 
seen, in the framework of the conventional analysis of externalities). As the author 
emphasises, social costs are violations of social rights, perpetrated by market capitalism, 
whether they occur in a Pareto efficient context or not. The social damage, even if less than 
the gains for companies, still represents a violation of social rights and for this very reason is 
no less important.  
According to Kapp, the free operation of the market promotes the ͞eǆteƌŶalisation͟ or, as 
he prefers to call it, the large scale shifting of a significant part of the total cost of production 
to the community (the conversion of ͞eǆteƌŶal͟ costs into social costs).  
The possibilities of ͞resistance͟ to this shift of costs by negotiating conflicting interests – 
following a Coasean line of thought – are, in Kapp͛s view, limited. There are several reasons 
which may explain this. Kapp (1978 [1963]: 267-268) suggests the following:  
RCCS Annual Review, 4, October 2012                                                                                                           Social Costs: Where Does the Market End? 
 
135 
(i) Some social costs, such as the damage caused to human health, may remain 
hidden (and ignored by those affected) for long periods of time;  
(ii) In the case of catastrophes such as floods, laŶdslides aŶd otheƌ ͞Ŷatuƌal͟ disasteƌs 
caused, or at least aggravated, by the irrational use of resources, social costs, and 
all the human suffering they imply, may be perceived as the result of merely 
natural causes;  
(iii) Certain kinds of damage, although significant overall, are spread out over a large 
number of people in such a way that individual losses are relatively negligible, and 
therefore do not appear to justify ͞defeŶsiǀe aĐtioŶ͟;  
(iv) Those directly affected by social costs may not have the (financial, legal or other) 
means to act in the appropriate way, namely by resorting to legal channels, to 
prevent the damage that is being inflicted upon them from continuing;  
(v) In general, those affected are in an inferior bargaining position and thus are less 
able to resist the power of companies and their organisations; for the latter, 
lobbying to prevent regulatory measures from being applied to their business 
activities is frequently more profitable than adopting measures to prevent social 
costs;  
(vi) Finally – and this is perhaps the most fundamental question – social costs are, as a 
rule, an inexorable product of the logic of the working of the market economy as a 
whole.  
In fact, Kapp contests the idea that social costs can, in general, be reasonably conceived 
within a framework of bilateral and reciprocal relations. In his view, social costs are 
associated with asymmetrical non-market relationships which are often involuntary, shaped 
by relatively powerful entities that impose their interests on the economically and politically 
weaker sectors of society. Economic actors have different opportunities to access the 
relevant information and different capacities for controlling or even manipulating this 
information, as well as unequal bargaining power. The problem of social costs therefore 
includes a dimension of power, and therefore politics – which is ignored by the dominant 
theory – without which it cannot be fully understood.  
At this point it is worth quoting Kapp himself: 
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[T]he fact that part of the costs of production can be shifted to third persons or to society as a 
whole is merely another way of saying that costs and hence profits depend at least to some 
extent on the power of the individual firm to do so. In short, what the conventional theory 
treats as given is in fact already the result of a constellation of market or non-market 
interdependencies between units of a heterogeneous character and with different degrees of 
economic control and domination. (Kapp, 1969: 335, my italics) 
Some years later, in one of his final works, Kapp would add: 
[T]he causal process is not, as a rule, bilateral in character, with specific polluters causing 
damage to specific, identifiable individuals or affected parties. In fact, the process has nothing 
in common with a typical two-persons, market relationship; it is not the result of any voluntary 
contractual transaction. The affected persons are as a rule without protection; they have no 
voice in the matter; they are victims of a process over which they have little if any control. The 
degradation of the quality of the environment happens, so to speak, behind their backs, and 
the possibilities of redress are limited or ineffective under prevailing compensation laws. (Kapp 
1977: 531, my italics) 
This brings us to a central feature of Kapp͛s appƌoaĐh: the idea that the causal processes 
that link production, the natural and social environment and individuals involve ͞economic͟ 
and ͞Ŷon-economic͟ dimensions within a complex network of systemic interdependencies.  
In his view, social costs are the result of the combined action of a plurality of factors, 
relations and causal processes, and can only be fully understood (and their effects 
minimised) within the framework of an approach that recognises (1) the open nature of 
socioeconomic systems, and (2) the circular and cumulative nature of these causal processes 
(Kapp, 1976). Their cumulative nature demands that consideration be given to critical 
thresholds (or critical zones), which is lacking in conventional analyses, on the basis of which 
social costs acquire a new relevance and meaning. Linear cause and effect mechanisms and 
theoretical approaches based on the conventional notion of equilibrium prove inadequate 
for analysing social costs.  
 
2. Fault lines  
There are many differences – some more significant than others – between the various 
approaches to social costs. I intend to highlight two of these which, in my view, represent 
fundamental fault lines between the dominant conventional approach and Kapp͛s radically 
heterodox approach. The first difference has to do with the concept of efficiency underlying 
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the two approaches; the second refers to the problem of valuation. In both cases we can see 
the central position the market assumes in the thinking of the authors under analysis.
12
 
In fact, the question of social costs is, from start to finish, a discussion about the place of 
the market. Daniel Bromley offers a good summary of the prevailing position amongst 
economists concerning the role of the market:  
[T]he centrality of markets is so pronounced in economics that instances in which markets do 
not (or cannot) work are regarded as cases of market failure – with the immediate implication 
that we should see what is necessary for markets to be established. Or, we derive the outcome 
that would obtain if a market could but be established. (Bromley, 1997: 1389) 
Kapp͛s positioŶ is ǀeƌǇ diffeƌeŶt: for him, what is important above all is to consider the 
limits of the market. One thing is certain: discussing the problem of social costs inevitably 
means discussing the role of the market (in theory and in terms of the reality of our 
economic systems). It is a complex question and, obviously, this text cannot accommodate a 
detailed discussion of all its aspects. In the sections which follow, the intention is simply to 
outline the terms of the debate.  
 
2.1. Pareto efficiency vs. social efficiency 
Despite their differences, traditional analyses of social costs, such as the one produced by 
Coase, have one essential point in common: they conceive of social costs as a problem of 
economic efficiency (a retreat from the Pareto optimum). Even when it is acknowledged, as 
Coase does, that efficiency does not rule out the question of choice criteria and that 
͞problems of welfare economics must ultimately dissolve into a study of aesthetics and 
morals͟ ;Coase, ϭϵϲϬ: ϰϯͿ, from the viewpoint of the economist, it all comes down to 
deciding, with the aim of preventing the more serious damage, whether the gain resulting 
from preventing damage is greater or lesser than the loss arising out of any measures 
designed to eliminate it. Questions of efficiency and equity remain on two completely 
separate levels. In strictly economic terms, only efficiency matters – the aggregate gains in 
terms of the production of goods (commodities).
13
 Questions associated with the 
                                                 
12
 The issue of power and the asymmetry of agents, ǁhiĐh featuƌes iŶ Kapp͛s ǁoƌk, as opposed to the idea of 
voluntary transactions between equal parties within a framework of reciprocity, as argued by Coase, also 
represents a fault line between the two approaches, as I have suggested elsewhere (Neves, 2012).    
13
 Considerations of efficiency and equity were both present in the work of Pigou. However, the question of the 
impossibility of interpersonal comparisons of utility raised by Robbins (1932) would translate, with the 
development of the Kaldor-Hicks criterion of potential Pareto improvement in the late 1930s, into the strict 
separation of these two normative criteria (see Zerbe Jr., 2001). Gradually the profession began to internalize 
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distribution of income and social well-being belong to the sphere of ethics, in which the 
economist has no expertise.  
Kapp rejects this view as being strictly formal, static, partial and incomplete, even to the 
point of classifying it as ͞empty͟ and ͞ambiguous͟ ;Kapp, ϭϵϲϱ: ϯϬϱ-306). In his judgment , it 
does not provide minimally adequate criteria for assessing the relative success or failure of 
any solution to the problem of social efficiency, since it does not (and cannot) take into 
consideration the institutional context, the relevance of the variables of (historical) time and 
(social) space, the possibilities of institutional change, or the real needs and basic 
requirements of human life. In addition, it also erroneously assumes a false dichotomy 
between ͞economic͟ and ͞Ŷon-economic͟ purposes.  
Kapp͛s eŶtiƌe aŶalǇsis of soĐial Đosts is, iŶ faĐt, ďased on the idea that what matters is 
maximising the benefits of economic activity – understood as social values – with a minimum 
of social costs. It is a problem of social efficiency. For Kapp, as for J. M. Clark before him, 
referring to social efficiency means considering overall economic performance from the 
point of view of the values of society, which implies defining substantive (rather than merely 
formal) criteria and objective indicators of well-being based on a substantive theory of 
essential human needs and behaviour.  
Even so, according to Kapp, such indicators do not dispense with the need for a strong 
element of collective deliberation and political decision-making with regard to the social 
values and objectives to be pursued. Social costs are, above all, a problem that concerns the 
institutional organisation of the economy. They constitute a collective problem whose 
resolution demands collective responses.  
 
2.2. The question of valuation 
As we have seen, within the conventional framework, the problem of social costs is, in the 
end, reducible to a problem of valuation. Coase was crystal clear in this respect: it is a matter 
of determining the value of costs and benefits based on information supplied by market 
prices, and choosing the solution that maximises the net benefits.  
                                                                                                                                                        
the (erroneous) idea that efficiency, unlike equity, could be considered value free. As Bromley states (1990: 
ϵϯͿ, ͞ďeĐause effiĐieŶĐǇ deƌiǀes fƌoŵ pƌoduĐtioŶ, ďeĐause gƌeateƌ pƌoduĐtioŶ of goods aŶd seƌǀiĐes is thought 
not to imply any value judgements, and because production can be weighted by market prices – which are 
themselves considered to be neutral – effiĐieŶĐǇ ďeĐoŵes sǇŶoŶǇŵous ǁith oďjeĐtiǀe aŶalǇsis.͟ 
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The practical difficulties of this undertaking are well known, particularly with regard to 
attributing value to non-market goods, as are the philosophical objections to the 
monetisation of human life and the awareness that, in certain cases, attributing a monetary 
value is, to say the least, questionable. But for most economists this is no more than a 
necessary and inevitable use of a convenient yardstick ;͞the ŵeasuƌiŶg ƌod of ŵoŶeǇ͟Ϳ, 
without which rational choice is considered impossible. In the words of Pearce, ͞like it or 
not, any decision implies a monetary valuation͟ (1978: 3). 
For Coase, market prices and, more generally, the possibility of using a monetary 
yardstick, are at the core of economic analysis. Actually, it is this possibility that in his view 
gives it the advantage, in comparison with other disciplines, in analysing the workings of the 
economic system (Coase, 1994 [1977]).  
For Kapp, however, social costs, like social benefits, have to be considered extra-market 
phenomena (Kapp, 1970). Monetary criteria, such as the principle of willingness to pay or 
accept compensation on the basis of market prices, are unsuitable for evaluating social costs 
and the consequent deliberations on the course of action to be followed. Since market-
generated prices do not adequately reflect the relative importance of human needs, the 
relative scarcity of production factors and the actual total costs of production, as indicators 
they aƌe ͞not only imperfect and incomplete; they are misleading͟ ;Kapp, ϭϵϳϬ: ϴϰϯ-844).  
It is therefore imperative, according to Kapp, to evaluate costs and benefits in terms of 
the value they have to society (their ͞ǀalue to soĐietǇ͟Ϳ14. Market price and social value are 
far from being one and the same thing. For the author, constructing a theory of social value 
constitutes the central problem of economic theory (Kapp, 1978 [1963]: 293), and this 
involves defining objective criteria for what is necessary and essential to human life and 
survival – his essential reference point – and a new social accounting.  
 
Final observations  
The markets – and the prices they generate – represent a powerful economic coordination 
mechanism. However, as this text should have made clear, they have considerable 
limitations. The wide range of costs ͞eǆteƌŶalised͟ by companies within the framework of 
                                                 
14
 ͞Value to societǇ͟ aŶd Ŷot ͞value in society,͟ in the apt words of J. M. Clark (2009 [1936]: 61), from whom 
Kapp borrowed the concept.  
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contemporary capitalism, with no repercussions on the price mechanism and on decisions 
regarding the allocation of resources, are a particularly striking example of these limitations.  
For most economists, this is undoubtedly an important economic problem – the problem 
of externalities, as it is generally termed in conventional economics literature – which 
demands a response in terms of defining public policies. Various solutions have been 
identified. In some cases they favour state measures, such as the so-called Pigouvian taxes 
or the regulation of private economic activities, whilst in other cases they are based on the 
definition of property rights and the creation of markets, such as the well-known example of 
the trading of greenhouse gas emission allowances. However, for these economists, 
͞externalities͟ do not threaten the basic theoretical foundations of traditional economic 
analysis, namely economic calculation based on market prices or analyses of efficiency based 
on the Pareto optimum.  
K. William Kapp͛s approach to social costs is very different, as we have seen. According to 
this author, in addition to constituting a fundamental and unavoidable economic problem 
within capitalist economies, social costs are an enormous challenge to contemporary 
economic science. If social costs originate from within the capitalist market economy, the 
solution to the problem must transcend the logic of the market.  
In the words of the editors of Social Costs and Public Action in Modern Capitalism, an 
indispensable collection of texts inspired by Kapp͛s ǁoƌk,  
By focusing on the market as the only possible economy, formal theory implicitly favours those 
economic and social interests that have most to gain from a diseŵďedded ŵaƌket. […] Societal 
goals should be a priority for the economy – and the economy should be an enhancement of 
social opportunities – rather than a constraint. Thus, the performance of the economy should 
be valuated in terms of the societal opportunities that it can achieve. (Elsner et al., 2006: 8) 
This is a complex and difficult exercise, but undoubtedly one worth undertaking.  
Translated by Sheena Caldwell 
Revised by Teresa Tavares 
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